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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 58 DECEMBER 1959 No. 2 
THE SUPREME COURT-OCTOBER 1958 TERM 
Bernard Schwartz* 
THE Supreme Court, reads a famous passage by Bryce, "feels the touch of public opinion. Opinion is stronger in America 
than anywhere else in the world, and judges are only men. To 
yield a little may be prudent, for the tree that cannot bend to the 
blast may be broken."1 
The history of the highest Court bears constant witness to the 
truth of Bryce's statement. Supreme Court action which has 
moved too far in one direction has always ultimately provoked 
an equivalent reaction in the opposite direction. Even an institu-
tion as august as the high tribunal cannot escape the law of the 
pendulum. 
The decisions of the Court during the October 1958 term seem 
to fit directly into the pattern observed by Bryce. In recent years, 
the Court itself has come under increasing criticism because of 
decisions which have been seen unduly to limit both congressional 
and state powers. During 1959, on the other hand, important de-
cisions were handed down which reaffirmed both congressional in-
vestigatory authority and state power in important areas. As has 
so often happened, the Court itself appears to have remolded its 
jurisprudence so as to render moot much of the criticism against it. 
Members of a society dominated by what has been well termed 
"government by lawsuit"2 tend all too often to forget the inher-
ently weak position of the judicial department. The basic strength 
of the high Court is not its constitutional position, but the accep-
tance by public opinion of its role as guardian of the Constitution. 
Justice Miller has said: 
"Dependent as its Courts are for the enforcement of their 
judgments upon officers appointed by the executive and re-
movable at his pleasure, with no patronage and no control of 
the purse or the sword, their power and influence rest solely 
• Professor of Law, New York University.-Ed. 
1 l BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, 3d ed., 273 (1908). 
2 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 286 (1941). 
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upon the public sense of the necessity for the existence of a 
tribunal to which all may appeal for the assertion and protec-
tion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and by the laws 
of the land, and on the confidence reposed in the soundness 
of their decisions and the purity of their motives."3 
From this point of view, action by the Court which brings its 
decisions into line with the dominant sense of the community can 
only be commended. In a representative, democratic government, 
as Chief Justice Vanderbilt well pointed out,4 the power of the 
judiciary depends largely on its reputation for independence, in-
tegrity, and wisdom. The Supreme Court can maintain its role 
only so long as it continues to maintain its reputation in these 
respects in the public eye. 
I. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATORY POWER 
Few aspects of legislative authority have received more public 
attention in recent years than the power of investigation. At 
times, in truth, it has seemed as if the chief role of our Congress 
has become that of what William Pitt the Elder once called the 
"Grand Inquest of the Nation."5 Certainly, since the last war at 
least, the congressman qua inquisitor has seemed almost to place 
the congressman qua legislator in the shade. 
"Scarcely any political question arises in the United States," 
acutely observed de Tocqueville over a century ago, "that is not 
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."6 And so it 
was to be expected that the exercise of congressional investigatory 
authority, too, would give rise to controversies for adjudication by 
the highest Court. Until the present Court, however, the dominant 
judicial theme in this field was that of abnegation. "Courts," said 
the Vinson Court in 1951, with regard to legislative investigative 
abuses, "are not the place for such controversies. Self-discipline 
and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or 
correcting such abuses."7 
All this appeared to be changed when, two years ago, the Court 
handed dmvn its decision in Watkins v. United States.8 In Wat-
· 3 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 at 223 (1882). 
4 VANDERBILT, THE DOCI'RINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY 
SIGNIFICANCE 140 (1953). 
5 TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 1 (1955). 
6 Quoted in American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 415 
(1950). 
7Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 at 378 (1951). 
s 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
1959] THE SUPREME COURT - 1958 TERM 167 
kins, for the first time in almost a century,9 the high bench found 
that an exercise of congressional investigatory authority exceeded 
the permissible limits upon legislative power. With Watkins, it 
seemed, the Court had assumed a definite position of overseer 
vis-a-vis legislative exertions of investigatory power. According to 
some, indeed, Watkins itself was a serious barrier even to legitimate 
exercises by the Congress of its inquiring function.10 
During the 1958 term, the Court indicated that the actual 
effect of Watkins was not nearly as extreme as many had feared. 
In this respect, it is important to distinguish between the actual 
holding in Watkins and the broad language of the Court's opinion 
there. The former constituted a needed check upon legislative 
investigations; the latter, if taken literally, could lead to emascula-
tion of the informing function of the Congress. 
The bare holding in Watkins was well stated in Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion there: "The actual scope of the in-
quiry that the [ congressional] Committee was authorized to con-
duct and the relevance of the questions to that inquiry must be 
shown to have been luminous at the time when asked."11 The 
"contempt of Congress" conviction at issue in Watkins was re-
versed because it had not been shown to the witness that the ques-
tions he had refused to answer were clearly pertinent to an author-
ized inquiry of the investigating committee. As the Court put it, 
"knowledge of the subject to which the_ interrogation is deemed 
pertinent ... must be available with the same degree of explicit-
ness and clarity that the Due Process Clause requires in the ex-
pression of any element of a criminal offense. "12 
The Watkins test of pertinency was the basis for the Court's 
decision in Scull v. Virginia.13 Defendant there was convicted of 
contempt in a Virginia court for refusing to obey a court order to 
answer certain questions put to him by an investigating committee 
of the Virginia legislature. The committee in question had been set 
up after the Supreme Court's desegregation decision and appeared 
to be aimed at organizations and individuals attempting to secure 
integration in Virginia schools. The resolution setting up the com-
mittee specified that it could inquire into three general subjects: 
(I) the tax status of racial organizations and of contributions to 
9 See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). 
lOSee Schwartz, "The Supreme Court-October 1956 Term," 32 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 
1202 at 1215 (1957). 
11354 U.S. 178 at 217 (1957). 
12 Id. at 208-209. 
1a 359 U.S. 344 (1959). 
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them; (2) the effect of integration or its threat on the public schools 
of Virginia and on the general welfare of the state; and (3) the 
violation of the laws against champerty, barratry~ and maintenance 
or the unauthorized practice of law.14 Defendant was asked thirty-
one specific questions, but it was not shown how any of them was 
pertinent to these subjects. In reversing defendant's conviction, 
the Court held that this violated the Wat kins pertinency test.15 
Defendant, said the court, did not in these circumstances, "have 
an opportunity of understanding the basis for the questions or 
any justification on the part of the Committee for seeking the in-
formation he refused to give."16 
One familiar with the workings of legislative committees and 
their all-too-common tendency to stray beyond the bounds of their 
authorizing resolutions cannot but agree with the Wat kins-Scull 
approach. A reading of the questions asked in Scull is bound to 
make one wonder how most of them had any relationship at all 
to the subjects the committee was authorized to investigate.17 
Under Watkins, investigative power must at least be canalized with-
in the bounds of pertinency - a limitation that imposes a needed 
check upon legislators who all too often interpret their investiga-
tive mandates as roving commissions to inquire into anything 
which appears suited to propel themselves into the headlines. 
As already indicated, however, the test of pertinency was but 
a small part of the Wat kins opinion. Instead of limiting himself 
to articulation of that test, the Chief Justice, who delivered the 
Wat kin$ opinion, used the occasion to write a broad essay on con-
gressional investigatory authority in which he went far beyond 
the bare holding of the case. 
This is what makes the decision last term in Barenblatt v. 
United States18 so significant. Barenblatt indicates that the Chief 
Justice's dicta in Watkins were just that-merely obiter. As such, 
they have only the effect enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in 
14 Id. at 347. 
15 Watkins itself is binding on the states because it lays down a rule of "fundamental 
fairness." Id. at 353. 
16 lbid. 
11 E.g., "Question 28 asked if the Communist Party used Box 218; Question 30 asked 
if Scull had ever been called as a witness before a Congressional Committee; Question 31 
asked if his name had ever been cited by any Congressional Committee as being on any 
list of members of any organizations that are cited as subversive. Nothing in the language 
of the Act authorizing the Committee or in the statement of Chairman Thomson about 
the subjects under inquiry could lead Scull to think that it was the Committee's duty to 
investigate Communist or subversive activities." Id. at 350, n. 5. 
1s 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
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his famous statement in Cohens v. Virginia19-i.e., general language 
which goes beyond the actual ratio ought not to control the judg-
ment in a subsequent suit. 
Barenblatt, like Watkins, involved a conviction for contempt 
of Congress arising from petitioner's refusal to answer certain 
questions put to him by a Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Un-American Activities. In this case, however, the Court felt 
that the pertinency of the questions asked was clearly established.20 
This brought the Court directly to the broader issues of the scope 
of congressional investigatory power with which Wat kins had 
gratuitously dealt. 
The Chief Justice's language in Watkins had cast doubt upon 
the validity of authorizing resolutions containing broad investiga-
tory mandates, such as that setting up the Un-American Activities 
Committee itself. Speaking of the charter of that committee,21 the 
Chief Justice had declared, "It would be difficult to imagine a less 
explicit authorizing resolution. Who can define the meaning of 
'un-American'?"22 Implicit in this was the view that the enabling 
resolution of the House committee was too vague to be valid. 
The difficulty with this view is that it loses sight of the prac-
tical realities of the legislative process. The exigencies of the con-
gressional calendar make it impossible for the mandates of com-
mittees to be laid down in other than broad terms. There is cer-
tainly as much justification for broad standards here as there is 
in the delegation of powers to administrative agencies.23 The 
Wat kins approach might invalidate the charters of most con-
gressional committees, since, as Justice Clark pointed out in his 
Wat kins dissent, the common practice is for such committees to 
be given power "in exceedingly broad terms."24 In addition, it is 
hard to see, under the Chief Justice's Watkins language, how a 
body like the Un-American Activities Committee could be given a 
valid charter. Its area of investigation must, of necessity, be de-
10 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 at 399 (1821). 
20 Even the dissenting members of the Court did not seem to question this. 
21 According to its enabling resolution, "The Committee on Un-American Activities, 
as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of 
(1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United 
States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa-
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the 
principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other 
questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." 
360 U.S. 109 at 116, n. 6 (1959). 
22 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 202 (1957). 
23 See SCHWARTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 37 (1958). 
24 354 U.S. 178 at 220 (1957). 
170 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
fined through terms such as "un-American." If such a term can-
not be defined with mathematical precision, it does nonetheless, in 
its broad contours, cover sufficiently a field which clearly comes 
within the· legitimate concern of the Congress. 
In Barenblatt, petitioner relied on Watkins as holding that 
the resolution authorizing the Un-American Activities Committee 
was invalid because of its vagueness in delineating the committee's 
jurisdiction. The majority of the Court rejected this argument. 
"We cannot agree with this contention," declared Justice Harlan, 
"which in its furthest reach would mean that the House-Un-
American Activities Committee under its existing authority has no 
right to compel testimony in any circumstances."25 The holding 
here is more consistent with legislative reality than the broad 
Watkins language. Whatever one may think of the manner in 
which the role of the Un-American Activities Committee has at 
times been exercised, that surely does not bear upon the congres-
sional power to constitute such a committee. 
The Watkins opinion did not limit itself to casting doubt upon 
the validity of the Un-American Activities Committee. Instead· it 
placed much of recent congressional investigating activity under a 
constitutional shadow. "We have no doubt," reads the most fre-
quently quoted passage of the Wat kins opinion, "that there is no 
congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure."26 
Petitioner in Barenblatt placed perhaps his principal reliance 
on this Watkins language, urging that the investigation at issue 
should not be deemed to have been in furtherance of a legislative 
purpose because the true objective of the committee was purely 
"exposure." The four dissenting justices27 agreed with this con-
tention. The majority, however, rejected it, in terms which in-
dicate that the Watkins dictum on "exposure for exposure's sake" 
itself is hardly to be taken as a controlling rule of law. 
In Wat kins, the Chief Justice went out of his way to stress 
restrictions upon legislative investigatory authority. In Barenblatt, 
the focus has completely shifted. At the very start of his opinion, 
Justice Harlan sets the theme by emphasizing, not the limitations, 
but the extent of the congressional power. "The scope of the power 
of inquiry, in short," he affirms, "is as penetrating and far-reaching 
as the potential power to _enact and appropriate under the Consti-
tution. "28 
25 360 U.S. 109 at 117 (1959). 
26 354 U.S. 178 at 200 (1957). 
27 Black, J., Warren, C.J., Douglas, J., and Brennan, J., dissented. 
28 360 U.S. 109 at Ill (1959). 
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Under Justice Harlan's approach, the key question for the 
Court to answer is whether the particular investigation was related 
to a valid legislative purpose. In Barenblatt, such relationship was 
said to be clearly established: "That Congress has wide power to 
legislate in the field of Communist activity in this Country, and to 
conduct appropriate investigations in aid thereof, is hardly de-
batable."29 
That being the case, it is irrelevant that petitioner claims that 
the true objective of the committee was "exposure" rather than 
the furtherance of a legislative purpose. "So long," states the 
Barenblatt opinion, "as Congress acts in pursuance of its consti-
tutional power, the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the 
basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that power."30 
If a congressional investigation, in other words, is related to a 
valid legislative purpose, it cannot be invalidated because the 
Court feels that its real purpose is the exposure of those being 
investigated. 
Barenblatt represents a needed corrective to the extreme im-
plications of the Wat kins opinion. Under it, the "power of in-
quiry [ may be] employed by Congress ... over the whole range of 
the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or 
decide upon due investigation not to legislate; it [may] similarly 
[be] utilized in determining what to appropriate from the national 
purse, or whether to appropriate."31 
Congressional investigatory authority is thus as broad as the 
legislative power itself. It encompasses both the sword and the 
purse and may be utilized in any area in which congressional 
power itself may be exerted. And, under Barenblatt, a court can-
not go behind such valid legislative purpose to determine that the 
true motive of the congressmen was only "exposure." 
It may be objected that such an approach will require the 
courts to uphold all but the most extravagant assertions of legis-
lative investigatory authority. Particularly, it will be said, this will 
leave the citizen helpless before possible abuses of congressional 
investigatory power such as those that have occurred all too fre-
quently in recent years. 
The danger of misuse is not, all the same, a ground for deny-
ing the existence and scope of a power. Certainly investigatory 
authority may be abused; the same is also true of the law-making 
29 Id. at 127. 
so Id. at 132. 
31 Id. at Ill. 
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power of the Congress and, indeed, of all governmental power.32 
But the possibility of abuse does not justify the courts in setting 
themselves up as the censors of what is, after all, the internal func-
tioning of a co-ordinate branch of government. The elected rep-
resentatives of the people, more directly responsible to the citi-
zenry than any other organ of government, should not be too 
closely restricted by the. courts in their efforts to bring to light 
anything that they feel should be subjected to public scrutiny. 
It would, in the words of Justice Jackson in a 1949 case, "be an 
unwarranted act of judicial usurpation . . . to assume for the 
courts the function of supervising congressional committees. I 
should ... leave the responsibility for the behavior of its commit-
tees squarely on the shoulders of Congress."33 
II. LOYALTY-SECURITY CASES 
Among the most difficult problems presented to the Supreme 
Court during the past decade has been that of dealing with the 
government's response to the "cold war" that has become so prom-
inent a feature of the post-war world. In terms of quantitative im-
pact upon the individual, perhaps the most important govern-
mental measures taken in this area have been the institution of 
various loyalty and security programs. In 1956, the federal loy-
alty-security program covered nearly six million civilian employees 
in both government and private industry.34 And, even after the 
scope of the program was narrowed that year by the Court's de-
cision in Cole v. Young,35 several million persons continued to be 
covered by it.36 
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on the 
matter, there can be little doubt about the substantive authority of 
the government to dismiss or refuse to hire employees who are dis-
loyal or constitute security risks.37 But, if the governmental power 
to bar the disloyal from its service has not really been open to ques-
tion, the same has not been true of the means used to implement 
the government's conceded authority in this connection. And this 
has been particularly true of the procedural aspects of the federal 
loyalty-security program. 
32 See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 175 (1927). 
33 Dissenting, in Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 at 196 (1949). 
34 See SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT 323 (1957). 
35 351 U.S. 535 (1956). 
36 See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 at 507, n. 31 (1959). 
37 Gamer v. Lqs Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), and Adler v. Board of Education, 
342 U.S. 485 (1952), are clearly based upon such authority. 
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It can hardly be denied that loyalty-security proceedings have 
not been carried on in accordance with all of the procedural safe-
guards that are deemed necessary in other fields of our law. The 
right of cross-examination can serve to illustrate this point. Every 
party to an administrative proceeding, reads the relevant section of 
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, "shall have the right 
... to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a 
full and true disclosure of the facts.38 In loyalty-security cases, how-
ever, the government has felt that to allow those charged with 
disloyalty to confront and cross-examine those who have given the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation the information upon which the 
charge is based would impair the investigative network which the 
FBI has built up. From the FBI's point of view, it is hardly worth-
while to destroy the usefulness of its undercover operatives by 
disclosing their identity. That game, the Bureau would say, is 
plainly not worth the candle.39 
At the same time, the failure to accord the rights of confronta-
tion and cross-examination has tended all too often to make the 
hearings accorded in loyalty cases a matter of empty form. This can 
be seen clearly from a case like Greene v. McElroy.40 Petitioner 
there had had his security clearance revoked after a hearing before 
the relevant board on charges of Communist associations. The 
essence of this "hearing" has been described by Chief Justice 
Warren: 
"The Government presented no witnesses. It was obvious, 
however, from the questions posed to petitioner and to his 
witnesses, that the Board relied on confidential reports which 
were never made available to petitioner. These reports 
apparently were compilations of statements taken from various 
persons contacted by an investigatory agency. Petitioner had 
no opportunity to confront and question persons whose state-
ments reflected adversely on him or to confront the govern-
ment investigators who took their statements."41 
In a case like this, the situation confronting petitioner was 
almost an impossible one. Where an individual does not know the 
identity of his accusers and cannot confront or cross-examine them, 
his task in refuting their charges becomes well-nigh insuperable. 
In such a case, in the Chief Justice's words, "not only is the testi-
3860 StaL 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1958) §1006(c). 
39 Compare BARTH, THE LoYALTY OF FREE MEN 133 (1951). 
40 360 U.S. 474 (1959). -
41 Id. at 479. 
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mony of absent witnesses allowed to stand without the probing 
questions of the person under attack which often uncover incon-
sistencies, lapses of recollection, and bias, but, in addition, even the 
members of the clearance boards do not see the informants or 
know their identities, but normally rely on an investigator's sum-
mary report of what the informant said without even examining 
the investigator personally."42 
How, it may be asked, can condemnation by "faceless inform-
ers"48 of the type involved in the Greene case be reconciled with 
the requirements of due process? 
It must be stated, in all frankness, that the Supreme Court has 
never given a satisfactory answer to this question. In fact, the 
Court has most carefully avoided having to give a reasoned reply 
to it. During the past term, too, the Court was able to reach 
decisions in this field without having to resolve the basic con-
stitutional issues involved. In Vitarelli v. Seaton,44 the Court in-
validated the dismissal of a Department of Interior employee, 
on the ground that the procedure followed had violated the depart-
ment's own regulations governing such cases. And, in the Greene 
case, the revocation of petitioner's security clearance (which had 
caused his discharge from employment with a government con-
tractor) was declared void because the relevant agency had not 
been expressly authorized by either the President or the Congress 
to act in such cases without affording those affected the safeguards 
of confrontation and cross-examination. By so holding, the Court 
again avoided tlie constitutional issue.45 
But the basic constitutional question still remains: can an in-
dividual be deprived of the fundamentals of fair play because the 
government finds that his case presents security problems? "Per-
haps the most delicate, difficult and shifting of all balances which 
the Court is expected to maintain," ·wrote Justice Jackson just 
before his death five years ago, "is that between liberty and 
authority."46 Keeping the balance is especially difficult in a time 
.of tension, when legitimate demands of security must be heard. 
42 Id. at 497-499. 
48The term used by Douglas, J., concurring, in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 at 350 
(1955). 
44 359 U.S. 535 (1959). 
45 "Before we are asked to judge whether, in the context of security clearance cases, 
a person may be deprived of the right to follow his chosen profession without full hearings 
where accusers may be confronted, it must be made clear that the President or Congress, 
within their constitutional powers, specifically has decided that the imposed procedures 
are necessary and warranted and has authorized their use." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 
474 at 507 (1959). 
-!6 JACKSON, THE SUPREME CoURT IN THE .AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GoVERNMENT 75. (1955). 
1959] THE SUPREME COURT - 1958 TERM 175 
At the same time, governmental action must be fitted into the mold 
of due process, even during a "cold war." Even then, the values 
inherent in the constitutional demand should make us hesitate 
before construing the law so as to deny adjective justice. 
In the loyalty-security cases, fair resolution of the procedural 
problem has been clouded by the aphorism that no one has a 
"right" to be a civil servant. Public employment is thus only a 
"privilege;" its possessor is not protected by constitutional pro-
cedural requirements. "Due process of law," in the phrase of a 
federal court, "is not applicable unless one is being deprived of 
something to which he has a right."47 
To deny the rudiments of adjective justice to the civil servant 
because public employment is only a privilege is to employ the 
kind of legal reasoning that has all the beauty of abstract logic and 
all the ugliness of injustice.48 To describe public employment as 
a "privilege" is really only a convenient way of avoiding the prob-
lem of due process. It does not at all follow that, because the law 
does not guarantee to anyone a right to public employment, the 
government can resort to any scheme for depriving people of their 
positions in the civil service. "The fact that one may not have a 
legal right to get or keep a government post does not mean that 
he can be judged ineligible illegally.''49 
Denial of basic adjective requirements has an even less sub-
stantial legal foundation in a case like Greene, where public em-
ployment was not involved. The governmental issue at action 
there affected petitioner in a clear pre-existing "right" - namely, 
that of private employment: "the right to hold specific private 
employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreason-
able governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and 
'property' concepts of the Fifth Amendment.''50 
If there is one principle that is established in our public law, 
it is that which prohibits a governmental agency from adversely 
affecting an individual in his personal or property rights without 
complying with the requirements of procedural due process, in-
cluding the fundamental rights of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion. Perhaps the most important portion of the Greene opinion is 
the following passage, in which this basic principle is reaffirmed: 
47 Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46 at 58, affd. by equally divided 
Court 341 U.S. 918 (1951). ' 
48 Compare Mitchell, "The Anatomy and Pathology of the Constitution," 67 JURID. 
REv. 1 (1955). 
49 Jackson, J., concurring, in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 
U.S. 123 at 185 (1951). 
GO 360 U.S. 474 at 492 (1959). 
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"Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in 
our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental 
action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness 
of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to 
prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the indi-
vidual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. 
While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, 
it is even more important where the evidence consists of the 
testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or 
who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by 
malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We 
have formalized these protections in the requirements of 
confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient 
roots."lil 
It is recognized that this language was not necessary to the 
Greene decision. Strictly speaking, therefore, it was delivered only 
by way of obiter. Yet it remains the only indication by the Court 
of its view on the constitutional issue involved in a case like Greene. 
And it points to ultimate resolution of that issue in favor of the 
procedural rights of the individual. In such a case, according to the 
Greene opinion, "We deal . . . with substantial restraints on em-
ployment opportunities of numerous persons imposed in a manner 
which is· in conflict with our long-accepted notions of fair pro-
cedures.''62 The plain implication here is that, at least where 
public employment is not involved, the individual cannot be 
deprived of his job by governmental action except after a hearing 
which comports with our traditional ideas of fair procedure53 -
including the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination,li4 
IJI. SUBVERSION AND THE STATES 
The decisions rendered during the past term point up the role 
of the high Court as the ultimate arbiter of the federal system. 
Few, if any, functions of that tribunal are of greater practical 
importance. It is the supreme bench which ensures that national 
authority is not frustrated by a "crazy quilt"66 of conflicting local 
laws. And, at the same time, it is that body which guarantees that 
the states will not ultimately be swallowed up by the government 
lil Id. at 496. 
112 Id. at 506-507. 
IISibid. 
54 Id. at 507. 
115 The term used by Frankfurter, J., concurring, in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 
at 388 (1946). 
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in Washington. It is, in truth, difficult to conceive how a federal 
system like ours could work in practice without a judicial umpire. 
As Chief Justice Taney aptly stated a century ago, "So long ... 
as this Constitution shall endure, this tribunal must exist with it, 
deciding in the peaceful forms of judicial proceedings the angry 
and irritating controversies between sovereignties, which in other 
countries have been determined by the arbitrament of force.''116 
Among the most sharply criticized decisions of the high Court 
in recent years have been those invalidating state laws on the 
ground of conflict ( express or, more commonly, implied) between 
them and federal legislation. To critics, these have been seen as 
judicial attempts to reduce the states to governmental sterility. 
Indeed, its decisions restricting state authority have been more 
instrumental than any others (aside from those in the field of 
racial discrimination) in leading to serious congressional attempts 
to curb the Court. 
But, as so often happens in our system, the justices themselves 
appear to have come to realize that they had gone too far in their 
jurisprudence in this field. In this writer's analysis of the 1957 
term, it was noted that the Court was indicating a readiness to 
uphold state power in situations where a contrary result might 
previously have been reached.117 The tendency in this direction 
continued during the 1958 term. In the fields of subversion and 
taxation of interstate commerce, state authority was recognized in 
a manner which (whether or not the Court consciously intended 
that result) is bound to remove much of the ammunition from 
critics of the high tribunal in this area. 
In its 1956 decision in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,68 the Court 
invalidated the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, on the ground that it 
was superseded by the Federal Smith Act, which proscribed the 
same conduct. The Nelson opinion declared that "Congress has in-
tended to occupy the field of sedition."159 Critics of the Court not 
unnaturally assumed that this meant just what it said and left the 
states without any authority to deal with sedition. Some went so 
far as to paint a picture of the states, helpless in the face of Com-
munist conspiracy - shorn of all power to cope with subversion 
against themselves. 
156 Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. (62 U.S.) 506 at 521 (1859). 
157 Schwartz, "The Supreme Court-October 1957 Term," 57 MICH. L. REv. 315 at 332 
(1959). 
ISS 350 U.S. 497 (1956). 
IS9 Id. at 504. 
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Whether or not that picture was ever accurate,60 it is plain that 
Uphaus v. Wyman61 makes it a distortion of reality. Uphaus arose 
out of an investigation undertaken under a resolution of the state 
legislature diretting an investigation of violations of the New 
Hampshire Subversive Activities Act. Appellant had been found 
guilty of contempt for refusal to produce certain documents before 
the legislative investigating committee.62 He contended that the 
Nelson decision barred all state action in the field of subversion, 
including legislative investigations. According to the Court, how-
ever, "The appellant's argument sweeps too broad."63 
As explained by Justice Clark in Uphaus, Nelson did not 
eliminate all state action in the field of subversion. Nelson, says 
the Uphaus opinion, "rejects the notion that it stripped the States of 
the right to protect themselves."64 What then is left for the states 
under Uphaus? Justice Clark mentioned the following: prosecu-
tions for sedition against the state itself; state activity in protection 
of itself either from actual or threatened sabotage or attempted 
violence of all kinds; and internal civil disturbances. "Thus regis-
tration statutes, quo warranto proceedings as to subversive corpora-
tions, the subversive instigation of riots and a host of other subjects 
directly affecting state security furnish grist for the State's legisla-
tive mill."65 
The Uphaus gloss on Nelson appears to be based upon a dis-
tinction between subversion against the United States and sub-
version against a state. The Smith Act prohibits knowing advocacy 
of the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force 
and violence.66 Nelson, says Uphaus, proscribed only state enforce-
ment of laws aimed at such subversion. It did not affect state 
authority to enforce laws barring such advocacy against a state's 
own government. It should, however, be pointed out that, valid 
though the distinction made by the Court in this respect may be 
as a matter of abstract logic, it has little practical reality. One 
engaged in subversive advocacy does not normally act according to 
the niceties of theoretical federalism. His advocacy is aimed at 
government, without regard to the nuances between federal and 
state power. Under Uphaus, all such subversion can be reached 
60 See id. at 500. 
61 360 U .s. 72 (1959). 
62 Under the relevant resolution, the state attorney general was constituted a one-
man legislative investigating committee. 
63 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 at 76 (1959). 
64Ibid. 
65 Id. at 77. 
66 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 at 499 (1956). 
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by the states - as it can be by the federal authorities under the 
Smith Act. Such result may be valid for a tribunal which is coming 
once again to scrutinize state authority with anything but a hostile 
eye. But it should be recognized that it is clearly inconsistent with 
the Nelson holding that Congress intended to occupy the field of 
sedition. Where Congress does occupy a field of regulation, it has 
spoken so as to silence the states - i.e., has acted so as to bar any 
state action at all ~n the particular field. 
IV. COMMERCE AND STATE POWER 
Even more significant than Uphaus in upholding state power 
are last term's decisions involving state taxation of interstate and 
foreign commerce. Two of these decisions, in fact, bid fair to be-
come landmark cases, for they make for notable departures in the 
law in this area. 
The first of the decisions referred to is Northwestern States 
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota.61 It involved the constitu-
tionality of state net income tax laws levying taxes on that portion 
of a foreign corporation's net income earned from and fairly ap-
portioned to business activities within the taxing state when those 
activities are exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce. 
The taxes in question were imposed under laws of Minnesota and 
Georgia. The Minnesota tax can serve as our illustration for pur-
poses of discussing the case. It was levied under a statute which 
imposes an annual tax upon the taxable net income of residents 
and nonresidents alike. One of four classes taxed by the statute 
is that of "domestic and foreign corporations ... whose business 
within this state during the taxable year consists exclusively of 
foreign commerce, inter-state commerce, or both." Minnesota 
utilized three ratios in determining the portion of net income tax-
able under its law. The first was that of the taxpayer's sales as-
signable to Minnesota during the year to its total sales during that 
period made everywhere; the second, that of the taxpayer's total 
tangible property in Minnesota for the year to its total tangible 
property used in the business that year wherever situated. The 
third was the taxpayer's total payroll in Minnesota for the year 
to its total payroll for its entire business in the like period. In the 
67 358 U.S. 450 (1958). Since this decision, Congress has enacted the Interstate Com-
merce Tax Act, P. L. 86-272, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (Sept. 14, 1959), barring the states from 
imposing net income taxes on income derived in the state from interstate commerce if 
the only business activities in the state are solicitation of orders to be approved and filled 
outside the state •. 
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instant case appellant took no issue with the fairness of this formula 
nor of the accuracy of its application. Appellant itself was an Iowa 
corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of cement, locally 
in Iowa and, in interstate commerce, to dealers in neighboring 
states including Minnesota. , 
The Court upheld the Minnesota tax upon the net income of 
appellant. According to its decision, "a net income tax on revenues 
derived from interstate commerce does not offend constitutional 
limitations upon state interference with such commerce."68 Nor 
does it make any difference that the commerce engaged in by 
appellant in Minnesota is purely interstate and that, in conse-
quence, the tax was on income derived exclusively from inter-
state commerce. The tax in question was part of a general scheme 
of state taxation, reaching all individual and corporate net income. 
The taxing statute was not, as Justice Harlan in his concurring 
opinion put it, sought to be applied to portions of the net income 
of appellant because of the source of that income-interstate co~-
merce-but rather despite that source.69 In the Court's view, it 
is not an improper interference with interstate commerce to permit 
a state within whose borders a foreign corporation engages in 
activities in aid of that commerce to tax the net income derived 
therefrom on a properly apportioned basis. 
The opinion of the Court is based upon ostensible rigid ad-
herence to stare ·decisis. It repeatedly asserts that it is only adher-
ing to principles laid down in prior decisions and disclaims any 
intent to break new constitutional ground. But, in actuality, the 
Court's holding is novel doctrine.70 According to Justice Whit-
taker, who dissented, "Neither the Court nor counsel have cited, 
and our research has not disclosed, a single opinion by this Court 
that has upheld a state tax laid on 'exclusively interstate commerce,' 
and we are confident none exists."71 This statement appears to be 
borne out by analysis of the prior cases. Though many cases sus-
tain state taxes imposed upon companies engaged in commerce, 
in none of them was the tax exacted from a business whose rev-
enue derived solely from •interstate commerce. 
This is not to say that there is not much to commend the 
Court's recognition of such state power to tax even interstate 
commerce. The constitutional barrier against state taxation in 
as 358 U.S. 450 at 458-459 (1958). 
69 Id. at 469. 
70 The characterization used in Justice Whittaker's dissenting Qpinion. Id. at 484. 
71Id. at 487. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter, id. at 470•471. 
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this field was primarily intended to prevent interstate commerce 
being placed at a disadvantage. The policy behind the commerce 
clause was aimed at what Justice Jackson aptly termed a collec-
tion of parasitic states preying upon each other's commerce.72 
But this hardly requires that interstate commerce be placed in a 
favored position. It, too, should share the burdens and costs of gov-
ernment and should not secure competitive advantage from tax 
immunity denied to local commerce. To put it another way, what 
the commerce clause requires is an equalization in the tax situa-
tion as between interstate and local commerce. The goal, in Pro-
fessor Freund's phrase, is to prevent an interstate transaction from 
being saddled with an aggregate tax burden higher than it would 
bear if it had taken place in the same volume and over the same 
distance within a single one of the pertinent states.73 At the same 
time, the commerce clause hardly requires that the tax burden 
be lower simply because state lines were crossed. 
In the instant case, equality is the theme of the tax at issue.74 
"The thrust of these statutes is not hostile discrimination against 
interstate commerce, but rather a seeking of some compensation 
for facilities and benefits afforded by the taxing States to income-
producing activities therein, whether those activities be altogether 
local or in furtherance of interstate commerce."75 Income derived 
from sales in a state should not receive immunity from taxation 
simply because they are interstate, when such immunity is denied 
to similar local sales. Nor, according to the Court, is there any real 
danger of a multiple burden resulting from the exactions in ques-
tion. "The apportioned tax is designed ... 'to prevent the levy-
ing of such taxes as will discriminate against or prohibit the 
interstate activities or will place the interstate commerce at a dis-
advantage relative to local commerce.' "76 
The second important case on state taxing power decided last 
term is Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Bowers.77 Appellant 
in that case operates an industrial plant in Ohio, where it manu-
factures iron and steel. In addition to the use of domestic ores, 
it imports iron ores from five countries. The imported ores arrive 
72 JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN TIIE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 67 (1955). 
73 FREUND, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME I.Aw, Cahn ed., 102 (1954). 
74 See Cardozo, J., in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 at 583 (1937). 
711 Harlan, J., concurring at 358 U.S. 450 at.469 (1959). 
76 Id. at 462. The Court concedes, however, that "In practical operation, . . . appor-
tionment formulas being what they are, the possibility of the contrary is not foreclosed, 
especially by levies fa domiciliary States." Ibid. 
77 358 U.S. 534 (1959). 
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in shiploads in bulk at a port of entry where they are unloaded 
from the ship into railroad cars and transported to appellant's 
plant. The plant is enclosed by a wire fence. Within the enclosure 
and adjacent to the manufacturing facilities are several ore yards 
for the storage of supplies of ore. When the imported ores arrive 
at this final destination, they are unloaded into one of the ore 
yards, but, because the ore from each country is different from 
the others and each is imported for a different use, the ores from 
each country are placed in separate piles in separate areas of the 
ore yard. The daily manufacturing needs for ore are taken from 
these piles. As ore from a particular "pile" in the ore yard is thus 
taken and consumed, other like ore is similarly imported from the 
same country and is brought to the plant and unloaded on top 
of the remainder of that particular pile. This course is con-
tinuously repeated. 
The Tax Commissioner of Ohio assessed an ad valorem tax 
against appellant based on the value of the iron ores in its ore 
yards, including the imported ores remaining in its storage piles. 
Appellant contended that the imported ores had not lost their 
character as imports and were therefore immune from state tax-
ation. 
As stated by Justice Whittaker, who delivered the Youngstown 
opinion, the question presented on- the above facts "is whether 
appellant[ s] ... have so acted upon the materials which they have 
imported for use in their manufacturing operations as to cause 
them to lose their distinctive character as 'imports,' within the 
meaning of that term as used in the Import-Export Clause, Art. I, 
§IO, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution."78 The state court 
held that appellant had done so. The majority of the Supreme 
Court agreed, basing their decision upon the view that imported 
goods lose their character as imports as soon as they are used for the 
purpose for which they were imported-in this case, use in manu-
facture. 
As in the already-discussed Northwestern States Cement case, 
the Court's opinion disowns the notion that it is doing more than 
following precedent. The analysis in Justice Frankfurter's dis-
sent, however, demonstrates convincingly tha_t Youngstown does, 
in fact, make new law. In particular, the Court's decision appears 
directly contrary to Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt,79 where the 
fact pattern precisely paralleled that presented here. Despite the 
78 Id. at 536. 
79 324 U.S. 652 (1945). 
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Court's express disclaimer of acting other than in accordance with 
that case, the holding and approach of the Youngstown opinion 
are remarkably similar to those urged by Justice Black, dissenting, 
in Hooven and Allison.80 The Court's approach is also contrary 
to the landmark opinion in Brown v. Maryland.81 According to 
John Marshall's famous formula there, "while remaining the prop-
erty of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or pack-
age in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty 
on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution."82 This 
formula seems clearly applicable to Youngstown, for the goods in 
question there remained in the hands of the importer in the form 
and shape in which they were brought into the country83-they 
clearly "had not been processed, changed from their original form 
or shape, acted upon, physically altered in the slightest, mingled 
with domestic goods, or 'used' in the sense that anything was done 
to them. "84 
But, if the reasoning in Youngstown is thus open to criticism, 
the same is not necessarily true of the decision there. There is 
much to be said for the extension of state power which the Court 
permits. What the Court really did in Youngstown was to draw a 
distinction for purposes of the import-export clause between goods 
imported for "sale" and goods imported for "use." Only the former 
are to be protected by the "original package" doctrine-i.e., they 
are exempt from state taxation while retained by the importer 
in their original "form or package"85 prior to their sale. The lat-
ter are not to share the same immunity. When they are used by 
the importer for the purpose for which they were imported, their 
tax exemption is at an end, even though they are still in their orig-
inal package or form. 
The considerations which support the holding that net income 
derived from interstate commerce in a state is subject to its taxing 
power apply with equal force to the Youngstown decision. The 
constitutional ban against state taxation of imports was intended 
to prevent "'[t]he great importing States [from laying] a tax on 
the non-importing States,' to which the imported property is or 
might ultimately be destined, which would not only discriminate 
against them but also 'would necessarily produce countervailing 
so Id. at 686. 
8112 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 419 (1827). 
s2 Id. at 442. 
83 See Taney, C.J., in The License Cases, 5 How. (46 U.S.) 504 at 575 (1847). 
84 358 U.S. 534 at 569-570 (1959). 
85 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 419 at 442 (1827). 
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measures on the part of those States whose situation, was less favour-
able to importation.' "86 But it hardly requires discrimination in 
favor of goods imported from other countries. It is true that there 
are indications that the qualification against only discriminatory 
state taxes in commerce-clause jurisprudence cannot be read into 
the import-export clause.87 There is much to be said, however, for 
an approach like that in Youngstown which assimilates the two 
clauses in this respect. Under it, the Constitution does not require 
that foreign products purchased for use of the importer be given 
what amounts to a tax subsidy at the expense of the particular state 
affected.88 In such a case, the foreign products should be "sub-
ject to taxation just like domestic property that was kept at the 
same place in the same way for the same use. We cannot impute 
to the Framers of the Constitution a purpose to make such a dis-
crimination in favor of materials imported from other countries 
as would result if we approved the views pressed upon us by the 
manufacturers. "89 
Closely related to the cases involving state taxation of com-
merce are those dealing with state regulation of commerce. Bibb v. 
Navajo Freight Lines9° is such a case. The Court there was asked 
to hold that an Illinois statute requiring the use of a certain type 
of rear fender mudguard on trucks and trailers operated on the 
highways of that state conflicts with the commerce clause of the 
Constitution. The statute provides that the guard shall con-
tour the rear wheel; it must be wide enough to cover the width 
of the protected tire, and must have a lip or flange on its outer 
edge of not less than two inches. Appellees, interstate motor car-
riers holding certificates from the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, challenged the constitutionality of the Illinois statute. A 
three-judge district court concluded that it unduly and unreason-
ably burdened and obstructed interst;;ite commerce, because it 
made the conventional or straight mudflap, which is legal in at 
least forty-five states, illegal in Illinois, and because the statute, 
taken together with a rule of the Arkansas Commerce Commission 
requiring straight mudflaps, rendered the use of the same motor 
vehicle equipment in both states impossible. The Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding unanimously that the challenged statute violated 
the commerce clause. 
86 358 U.S. 534 at 545 (1959) (quoting from Brown v. Maryland). 
87 See Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 at 75-76 (1946). 
88 Black, J., dissenting, in Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 at 690 (1945). 
89 358 U.S. 534 at 549-550 (1959). 
00 359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
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The Court emphasized the findings below that installation 
of the contour mudguards imposed a substantial financial burden 
on truckers01 and that such mudguard possessed no advantages in 
terms of safety over the conventional straight flap permitted in 
almost all states. But this was not the real basis of its decision. 
The vice of the challenged statute is to be found in the uncon-
stitutional burden it imposes on the movement of interstate com-
merce. Such burden arises from the prescription by one state of 
standards for interstate commerce which conflict with the stand-
ards of another state, "making it necessary, say, for an interstate 
carrier to shift its cargo to differently designed vehicles once an-
other state line was reached."92 This was clearly true under the 
rule of the Arkansas commission already mentioned which requires 
straight mudflaps. To permit Illinois to enforce her law, while 
mudguards remain unregulated or are regulated by varying stand-
ards in other states, must inevitably result in an impairment of 
uniformity of interstate transportation, because truckers are sub-
jected to regulation which is not uniform in its application. Hence 
the Court's holding that the statute in question results in a "rather 
massive ... burden on interstate commerce."93 
Looked at in this way, Bibb represents only a modern appli-
cation of the fundamental principles laid down over a century 
ago in Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens.94 Here, too, to para-
phrase the oft-quoted language of Justice Curtis there, the sub-
ject of regulation requires a uniform system, or plan of regulation; 
it is not best provided for by as many systems of regulation as the 
legislative discretion of the several states should deem applicable.05 
The Bibb opinion relies in large part upon Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Arizona,96 where a state statute prescribing a maximum length of 
seventy cars for freight trains moving through the state was in-
validated on grounds exactly like those stated in Bibb itself.97 
It certainly appears logical for the Court to apply the same 
rules to state regulation of interstate trucks as to state regulation 
of interstate railroads. As the Bibb opinion puts it, "The various 
91 The district court found that the initial cost of controlling the mudguards on all 
the trucks owned by appellees ranged from $4,500 to $45,840. Id. at 525. 
92 Id. at 526. 
93 Id. at 528. 
94 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851). 
95 Id. at 319. 
96 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
97 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), which the Court says is even "more closely 
in point," 359 U.S. 520 at 526 (1959), does not seem as relevant, since it did not involve 
any safety regulation at all. 
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exercises by the States of their police power stand ... on an equal 
footing."98 The only difficulty arises from the fact that prior de-
cisions seem to make a clear distinction between regulation of 
trucks and railroads in this respect. Thus, in the Southern Pacific 
case, the Court had felt compelled to distinguish South Carolina 
Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.,99 which had upheld a state 
statute prescribing maximum widths and weights for trucks on the 
state's roads. Although this law was basically similar to that declared 
invalid in Southern Pacific (and, it may be noted, to that in Bibb), 
the Court in Southern Pacific explained the seeming inconsistency 
by emphasizing the difference between motor and rail transporta-
tion: "Unlike the railroads local highways are built, owned and 
maintained by the state. . . . The state is responsible for their 
safe and economical administration."100 In the field of motor 
vehicle regulation, in other words, an added element is present 
which tips the scales in favor of state regulatory power-namely, 
that motor vehicles use highways furnished and maintained by 
the state. Since the South Carolina case, the distinction thus 
drawn has been used to uphold many state laws regulating motor 
vehicles, even though their prescriptions applied to interstate as 
well as purely local traffic.101 
The Court in Bibb all but ignores the South Carolina case, 
saying that the language in it contrary to its decision cannot 
be read in isolation from such later decisions as Southern Pacific.102 
But, as already pointed out, the Southern Pacific opinion expressly 
disclaimed any intent to overrule South Carolina; it rested upon 
the distinction between highways and railroads which justified 
more extensive control by the states over the former. 
It should not, all the same, be assumed from this that the 
result reached in Bibb is necessarily undesirable. There is much 
less reason for upholding state power here than in the tax cases. 
Relying on South Carolina, the states have set up all-pervasive 
systems of highway regulation that appear to be contrary to the 
philosophy behind the commerce clause. It is paradoxical that, in 
a country dominated by the free-trade concept of the commerce 
clause, interstate commerce by motor must obtain separate per-
mits, conform to conflicting rules, and pay toll every time it crosses 
a new state line. It is to be hoped that Bibb indicates that the 
98 359 U.S. 520 at 529 (1959). 
99 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
100 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 at 783 (1945). 
101 See cases cited in SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT 211-212 (1957). 
102 359 U.S. 520 at 528 (1959). 
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Court will henceforth regard such state obstructions to motor 
commerce with the same jealous eye that it turns to state clogs upon 
railroad mobility. 
One who examines the commerce decisions of the past term 
is bound to conclude that they illustrate a tendency-unfortunately 
not too infrequent in the present Court-to support even correct 
decisions with inadequate reasoning and analysis. In its North-
west States Cement opinion, the Court animadverted on the "need 
for clearing up the tangled underbrush of past cases" in this field, 
asserting that "the decisions have been 'not always clear ... con-
sistent or reconcilable.' "103 Unfortunately, the decisions discussed 
on commerce and state power appear only to compound the con-
fusion. Although, as pointed out, the results in each of these cases 
can be justified, the analysis in the Court's opinions can hardly 
serve to clarify. The desire to appear consistent with precedent 
may be understandable in a tribunal constantly censured with hav-
ing relegated stare decisis to constitutional limbo. Still, it hardly 
justifies the twisting of clear prior decisions to make them appear 
to mean something other than what they have always meant to the 
profession. To treat stare decisis as an exercise in extreme procrus-
teanism is scarcely the way to meet men's reasonable expectations 
for certainty in the law. Where new ground is clearly broken by 
decisions such as those discussed, it hardly helps for the Court 
to act as though it were only treading on old ground.104 
v. CRIMINAL CASES 
Among the most important aspects of the high Court's role 
as the arbiter of federalism is its function in reviewing state crim-
inal convictions. This function has come to be exercised with in-
creasing frequency in recent years. Indeed, so common has judicial 
intervention from Washington in the criminal sphere become that 
it has led some to assert that the Supreme Court has assumed the 
position of a virtual court of criminal appeal from the state courts. 
But this misconceives the actual function of the high bench 
in this area. The Court may be the hierarchical head of the federal 
judicial system. The same is clearly not true of its relationship 
to the state courts. The framers never intended to compound the 
American legal system into one common judicial mass.105 The 
10S 358 U.S. 450 at 457-458 (1959). 
1~ Compare Frankfurter, J., in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 
358 U.S. 450 at 473 (1959). 
105 Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 403 (1819). 
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Court stated early in 1959: "Some recent suggestions that the 
Constitution was in reality a deft device for establishing a cen-
tralized government are not only without factual justification but 
fly in the face of history. It has more accurately been shown that 
the men who wrote the Constitution as well as the citizens of the 
member States of the Confederation were fearful of the power of 
centralized government and sought to limit its power."106 In the 
judicial sphere, the organic instrument was not intended to re-
duce the state courts to subordinates of one central tribunal, with 
the latter exercising full appellate authority over all state decisions. 
On the contrary, the power of the highest Court to undo convic-
tions in the state courts is limited to enforcement of those rights 
secured by the Constitution. 
What this means as a practical matter in specific cases is a 
'more difficult question. The Fourteenth Amendment, without 
any doubt, imposed upon the Court some responsibility over the 
caliber of criminal justice dispensed in the states. But how much 
responsibility was the Court supposed to assume? Or, to put it 
in the more specific context in which it has arisen, did the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose upon the 
criminal law of the states all the restrictions contained in the Bill 
of Rights or did it require something less? 
If any question has been answered consistently by the Su-
preme Court, it has been this one. "We have held from the be-
ginning and uniformly that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not apply to the States any of the pro-
visions of the first eight amendments as such."107 It is true that 
a contrary view has been urged in the present Court by Justices 
Black and Douglas.108 But even they have conceded that theirs 
has not been "the prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."109 , 
Though the law on · the subject thus appears clearly settled, 
the. Court during the past term found it necessary to reiterate in 
detail its holdings in the matter. Accoi:ding to its opinion in 
Bartkus v. Illinois,11° it is established "conclusively that Congress 
and the members of the Legislatures of the ratifying St~tes did 
not contemplate that the Fourteenth Amendment was a short-
106 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 at 137 (1959). 
101 Id. at 124. 
108 See cases cited, id. at 151, n. 1. 
109 Dissenting, id. at 150. 
110 359 U.S. 121 (1959). 
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hand incorporation of the first eight amendments making them 
applicable as explicit restrictions· upon the States."111 
Nor did the Court satisfy itself in Bartkus with simple re-
iteration of established doctrine. Justice Frankfurter's opinion 
contains a detailed analysis and table of the specific provisions 
which correspond to the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments 
in the constitutions of the states which ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as well as of those states entering the Union after such 
ratification. These, Justice Frankfurter shows, indicate beyond 
any doubt the soundness of the Court's consistent decisions on 
the subject. "Surely this compels the conclusion that Congress 
and the States have always believed that the Due Process Clause 
brought into play a basis of restrictions upon the States other 
than the undisclosed incorporation of the original eight amend-
ments."112 
At first glance, the exhaustive Frankfurter ,effort-based as it 
was on intensive scholarly research into the constitutions of almost 
all the states-appears to have as its purpose only the superfluous 
hammering of additional nails into the coffin of dead constitu-
tional doctrine. It should nevertheless be noted that the view 
rejected once again in Bartkus has displayed amazing persistence 
for doctrine that has never commanded the adherence of a ma-
jority of the Court. Even after it had been rejected for over 
half a century, it was still able to receive the concurrence of four 
justices in 1944.113 More recently, it has been advocated only by 
Justices Black and Douglas. Since 1957, however, the Black-Doug-
las wing of the Court has come close to constituting a majority.114 
Justice Frankfurter may have deemed it necessary to reaffirm the 
established doctrine in order to anticipate a renewed effort by 
Justices Black and Douglas to win over a majority. From this 
point of view, his detailed analysis of state constitutions could 
strongly buttress the majority holding, thus making it less likely 
that the minority approach would be adhered to by other than the 
three justices who dissented in Bartkus.115 
Bartkus itself involved a problem that is inherent in the very 
111 Id. at 124. 
112 Id. at 126. 
llSAdamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 68 (1944). 
114 During the 1957 term, Justices Douglas and Black again asserted their view on the 
matter in dissent. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 at 477, 480 (1958). Chief Justice 
Warren also dissented there. · 
115 It should be noted particularly that Justice Brennan, who has often joined with 
the Black-Douglas-Warren wing of the Court, concurred in the Bartkus opinion. He had 
abstained in the Hoag case. 
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n~ture of our federalism. In our system, unlike that which pre-
vails in many others, both the nation and the states are provided 
with the complete accoutrements of government; each is com-
posed of fully developed legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches. In such a system, an individual may commit an act 
which constitutes a crime under the laws of both jurisdictions. 
If such a case arises, can he be tried, convicted, and sentenced in 
both a federal and state court? Or, if acquitted in one, can he be 
tried again in the other on the same facts? 
Petitioner in Bartkus was tried in 1953 in a federal court 
for robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association 
located in Illinois. The case was tried to a jury and resulted in 
an acquittal. In 1954, an Illinois grand jury indicted petitioner. 
The facts recited in the Illinois indictment were substantially 
identical to those contained in the prior federal indictment. The 
Illinois indictment charged that these facts constituted a viola-
tion of the Illinois robbery statute. Petitioner was tried and con-
victed in the Illinois court and was sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Petitioner's plea of autrefois acquit was rejected by the 
Illinois courts. Before the Supreme Court, he contended that his 
state conviction after a federal acquittal violated the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
What is the test to determine whether due process has been 
violated in such a case? The Bartkus opinion restates that which 
had been developed in the cases rejecting the view that due process 
in the Fourteenth Amendment includes all of the specific rights 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Quoting Justice Cardozo in a 
leading case,116 Justice Frankfurter states, "About the meaning 
of due process, in broad perspective unrelated to the first eight 
amendments, he suggested that it prohibited to the States only 
those practices 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.' "117 In 
other words, it is not enough, under the Court's test, that there 
has been only a violation of a specific provision of the Bill of 
Rights; the state practice at issue must be one which the highest 
Court finds repulsive. Due process in the Fourteenth Amendment 
thus bars procedures which shock "the conscience of society ascer-
tained as best it may be by a tribunal disciplined for the task and 
environed by the best safeguards for disinterestedness and de-
tachment.''118 
116 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 323 (1937). Like Bartkus, it also involved a 
claim of double jeopardy. · 
111 359 U.S. 121 at 127 (1959). 
118 Id. at 128. 
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The present writer's analysis last year of Hoag v. New Jersey119 
would indicate that, to him at least, multiple prosecutions against 
one individual growing out of the same fact pattern shock one's 
sense of justice. The Bartkus Court would, however, assert that 
one's personal notions of justice should not be controlling here. 
"Time," says Justice Frankfurter, "has not lessened the concern 
of the Founders in devising a federal system which would likewise 
be a safeguard against arbitrary government. The greatest self-
restraint is necessary when that federal system yields results with 
which a court is in little sympathy."120 
To the Court, the fulcrum of decision in Bartkus is the caution 
which the Constitution imposes upon the high bench in review-
ing the decisions of coordinate judicial tribunals, wholly independ-
ent in their own sphere. It must be remembered that the ques-
tion of double jeopardy presented in the Bartkus type of case is 
one that has arisen before. "Constitutional challenge to succes-
sive state and federal prosecutions based upon the same trans-
action or conduct is not a new question before the Court. . . . 
The Fifth Amendment's proscription of double jeopardy has been 
invoked and rejected in over twenty cases of real or hypothetical 
successive state and federal prosecution cases before this Court."121 
The 1922 Lanza case122 squarely held valid a federal prosecution 
arising out of the same facts which had been the basis of a prior 
state conviction. 
In Abbate v. United States123-a companion case to Bartkus-
the Court was asked to overrule Lanza. Petitioners there were 
convicted in an Illinois court of conspiracy to blow up certain 
property. After receiving prison sentences in Illinois, they were 
indicted and convicted of the same conspiracy in a federal district 
court and again sentenced to prison. The Court, however, refused 
to overrule the 1922 decision. "No considerations or persuasive 
reasons not presented to the Court in the prior cases are advanced 
why we should depart from its firmly established principle. On the 
contrary, undesirable consequences would follow if Lanza were 
overruled. "124 
If Lanza is still the rule and a subsequent federal prosecution 
119 356 U.S. 464- (1958). See Schwartz, "The Supreme Court-October 1957 Term," 57 
MICH. L. REv. 315 at 339 (1959). 
120 359 U.S. 121 at 137-138 (1959). 
121 Id. at 128-129. 
122United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). 
123 359 U.S. 187 (1959). 
124 Id. at 195. 
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is not.barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, it would hardly make sense to hold that a subsequent state 
prosecution is so shocking as to contravene due process. This is 
the real basis for the Bartkus decision. 
The limitations involved in the Court's review of state con-
victions on due process grounds also explain the decision in Frank 
v. Maryland.12r. Appellant there was convicted for violating a 
provision of the Baltimore City Code which made it an offense 
to refuse admission to a house to a health inspector who sought 
entry to investigate sanitary conditions. In the instant case, an 
inspector requested entry to appellant's house, stating that he had 
evidence of rodent infestation there. Appellant refused. His arrest 
and conviction followed, although it was not disputed that at no 
time did the inspector have a warrant authorizing him to enter. 
The Supreme Court, by a bare majority, affirmed appellant's 
conviction. On the surface, the decision in this respect appears 
contrary·to District of Columbia v. Little,126 where the Court had 
held that a refusal to admit a health inspector without a warrant 
did not justify a conviction for violating a regulation prohibiting 
interfering with an inspector in the performance of his duties. It 
is true that the Court there expressly disclaimed decision on the 
question of whether municipalities could constitutionally pro-
vide for health inspections without warrants. Yet the Little case 
has generally been assumed to answer that question, at least by 
implication, in the negative.127 
Little, nevertheless, involved a federal conviction. Under the 
Court's interpretation of due process, as already emphasized, con-
trol over state convictions does not proceed upon the same basis 
as does control over federal ones. Where a state conviction is 
at issue, it is not. enough for reversal that a similar federal con-
viction would fall as contrary to a specific guaranty in the Bill of 
Rights. In such a case, more is required: only if the state convic-
tion was secured by methods which are so extreme as to be shock-
ing must it be reversed. 
Under the leading case of Wolf v. Colorado,128 the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not impose upon the states the federal rule re-
quiring the reversal of federal convictions based upon evidence 
secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Frank follows 
12r. 359 U .s. 360 (1959). 
126 339 U.S. 1 (1950). 
127 If Little's constitutional objection was clearly invalid, how could it be said he was 
not "interfering" within the meaning of the relevant regulation? 
12s 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
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a similar approach. Though, under Little, entry by a federal in-
spector without a warrant may contravene the Fourth Amend-
ment, that alone does not require reversal of the Frank conviction. 
The Court in Frank was strongly influenced by the fact that 
the procedure of health inspection without a warrant is one that 
has existed for over a century and a half. "The power here chal-
lenged rests . . . on a long history of its exercise. "129 This has 
been true not only in Baltimore (the city where Frank arose); 
it has been the uniform practice of agencies of local government 
to provide for similar inspections in connection with sanitation, 
plumbing, building, and the like.130 To be sure, due process issues 
are not to be decided alone by a Gallup poll of governmental 
practice. At the same time, the Fourteenth Amendment clearly 
did not "destroy history for the States."131 Where what is at issue 
in a case is a "time-honored procedure"132 which is generally fol-
lowed in other states, that is bound to be of great weight in de-
termining whether fundamental notions of justice are being vio-
lated. In Justice Frankfurter's words in Frank, "what free people 
have found consistent with their enjoyment of freedom for cen-
turies is hardly to be deemed to violate due process .... "133 This is 
particularly true when the conditions calling forth the state power 
at issue have, if anything, been constantly growing in intensity. 
"There is a total want of important modification in the circum-
stances or the structure of society which calls for a disregard of so 
much history. On the contrary, the problems which gave rise 
to these ordinances have multiplied manifold, as have the diffi-
culties of enforcement."134 
This is not to say, to be sure, that due process must necessarily 
imprison criminal procedure in an eighteenth-century strait jacket. 
It is, on the contrary, a plastic concept which, in appropriate cases, 
does enable "a free society to advance in its standards of what is 
deemed reasonable and right."1311 The type of case in which due 
process can expand to meet changing conceptions of the essentials 
of justice was strikingly illustrated in the Court's 1956 Griffin 
129 359 U.S. 360 at 371 (1959). 
130 See District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 at 3 (1950). 
131 Holmes, J., in Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22 at 31 (1922). 
132 359 U.S. 360 at 370 (1959). 
183 Id. at 371. 
184 Ibid. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959), in which probable 
jurisdiction was noted in a case presenting substantially the same facts and issues as Frank 
v. Maryland. 
1811 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 at 27 (1949), quoted in 360 U.S. 360 at 371 (1959). 
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decision,136 where it was held to violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment for a state to deny to defendants alleging poverty free tran-
scripts of the trial proceedings, which would enable them ade-
quately to appeal from their convictions. The right to such a free 
transcript may be a relatively recent one in our law. But a rule 
whose effect is to deny the poor an adequate appellate review is 
today an utter misfit in a country dedicated to equality of justice. 
Burns v. Ohio137 involved an application of the Griffin hold-
ing. The question presented there was whether a state may con-
stitutionally require that an indigent defendant in a criminal case 
pay a filing fee before permitting him to file a motion for leave to 
appeal in one of its courts. This question seems even easier to 
decide than that in Griffin, for "At least in Griffin, the defendant 
might have raised to the Supreme Court any claims that he had 
that were apparent on the bare record, though trial errors could 
not be raised. Here, the action of the State has completely barred 
the petitioner from obtaining any review at all in the Supreme 
Court of Ohio."138 Ohio urged, however, that Griffin should not 
apply because appeal to its Supreme Court was a matter, not of 
right, but of discretion. In the Court's view, "this argument misses 
the crucial significance of Griffin.''139 Under the Griffin approach 
to due process, indigents must be given the "same opportunities 
to invoke the discretion of the Supreme Court of Ohio"140 which 
they would have if they had adequate financial resources. This 
they do not have, since, under the Ohio practice, without paying 
the filing fee, they cannot at all have the Ohio court consider on 
the merits their applications for leave to appeal. As the Chief 
Justice puts it, "The imposition by the State of financial barriers 
restricting the availability of appellate review for indigent crim-
inal defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice 
Under Law."141 
Among the common cases which require the Court to apply its 
concept of criminal due process are those arising out of denials of 
counsel and the use of allegedly coerced confessions. The prin-
ciples to govern decision of the due-process question in such cases 
are those laid down in the Betts142 and Ashcraft143 cases. In the 
186 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
137 360 U.S. 252 (1959). 
138 Id. at 258. 
139 Id. at 257. 
140 Id. at 258. 
141Ibid. 
142 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
148 Ashcraft·v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 ·(1944). 
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present Court, however, it seems apparent that there is a willing-
ness to apply such principles in a manner favorable to defend-
ants.144 Thus, in Cash v. Culver,145 the denial of counsel was held 
improper "because of the complexity of the proceedings.''146 The 
conviction was based on accomplice evidence and, says the Court, 
a layman would hardly be familiar with his rights under the state's 
law to impeach such evidence. There were also questions with 
regard to the admissibility of evidence and impeachment of prose-
cution witnesses which raised problems "beyond the ken of a lay-
man. "147 One wonders, nevertheless, whether the same type of 
thing cannot be said in almost any case where an accused is not 
accorded the assistance of counsel. Without the guiding hand of 
counsel, even the educated and intelligent layman is under dis-
advantages comparable to those emphasized by the Court in Cash. 
To look at a criminal trial the way the Cash opinion does is to go 
far toward holding that almost every denial of counsel violates the 
"fair trial" test laid down in the Betts decision.148 
In the 1944 Ashcraft case,149 the Court had held that, where the 
accused had been held incommunicado for thirty-six hours, dur-
ing which time, without sleep or rest, he had been interrogated by 
relays of police officers, the situation was "so inherently coercive" 
as to vitiate any confession secured under such circumstances. In 
Spano v. New Y ork,150 defendant was questioned for eight straight 
hours, starting in early evening after defendant had surrendered 
himself to the authorities. Here, too, the Court held that the con-
fession was invalid. "We conclude that petitioner's will was over-
born by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused, 
after considering all the facts. "151 The facts here should be com-
pared with those in the I 953 Stein case,152 where confessions made 
during an illegal detention of thirty-two hours, during twelve hours 
of which defendants were closely questi!)ned, were held not barred 
by due process. 
To those who looked upon Stein as an unwarranted watering 
144 But see Anonymous No. 6 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959), where the holding of 
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), was applied. 
145 358 U.S. 633 (1959). 
146 Id. at 637. 
147 Id. at 638. 
l48Note 142 supra. 
14_9 Note 143 supra. 
150 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
151 Id. at 323. 
152 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). 
196 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
down of Ashcraft,153 Spano will represent a wel_come swing of the 
judicial pendulum. Indeed, Spano may indicate that the Court 
now is ready to go even farther than its bare holding would indi-
cate. According to the opinion by the Chief Justice there, "The 
abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not 
turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on 
the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while 
enforcing the law."154 But, whenever a confession is made during 
a period of illegal detention, it is based upon police disobedience 
of the law. Does this mean then that a state confession made during 
illegal detention is barred by due process? If it does, the basic 
distinction between federal and state convictions in this respect 
may be on the way to being erased by the present Court.155 
VI. JENCKS AND THE JENCKS STATUTE156 
One of the most significant cases in recent years, from the point 
of view of the rights of criminal defendants, was Jencks v. United 
States.151 In it, the high tribunal added a new dimension of eviden-
tiary fair play to federal criminal procedure.158 In Jencks, the 
Court laid down a broad rule on the right of a defendant to dis-
closure of documents in the government's possession. According 
to the Court last term, in pithily expressing the effect of the Jencks 
holding, it decided "that the defense in a federal criminal prosecu-
tion was entitled, under certain circumstances, to obtain, for im-
peachment purposes, statements which had been made to govern-
ment agents by government witnesses. These statements were 
therefore to be turned over to the defense at the time of cross-
examination if their contents related to the subject matter of the 
witness' direct testimony, and if a demand had been made for 
specific statements which had been written by the witness or, if 
orally made, as recorded by agents of the Government. We also 
held that the trial judge was not to examine the statements to 
determine if they contained material inconsistent with the testi-
mony of the witness before deciding whether he would turn them 
over to the defense. Once the statements had been shown to con-
153 See SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT 182 (1957). 
154 360 U.S. 315 at 320 1959). 
155 See SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT 180-181 (1957). 
156 In assessing the present writer's remarks in this section, it should be borne in mind 
that he has been of counsel in a pending case involving the Jencks problem in an ad-
ministrative agency. 
157 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
l58See comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1409 (1959). 
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tain related material only the defense was adequately equipped 
to decide whether they had value for impeachment."159 
Jencks, as is well known, was one of the most controversial of 
recent Supreme Court decisions. "The decision," the Court itself 
has conceded, "promptly gave rise to sharp controversy and con-
cern."160 Jencks was decided on June 3, 1957. The very next day 
a bill was introduced in the Congress to deal with what was said 
to be the "serious problem" posed by it. On September 2, 1957, 
the criminal code was amended by adding a new section to govern 
statements and reports of witnesses in criminal proceedings.161 
What is the effect of this so-called Jencks statute on the rule 
enunciated by the Supreme Court? In the first place, there is the 
question of the constitutional power of the Congress to enact the 
statute. That question was answered in the affirmative in Palermo 
v. United States.162 It holds that, since its enactment, it is the 
Jencks statute, not the Supreme Court decision, that governs the 
production of statements of government witnesses for a defendant's 
inspection at a criminal trial. Jencks, says the opinion in Palermo, 
was an exercise of the Court's "power, in the absence of statutory 
provision, to prescribe procedures for the administration of justice 
in the federal courts."163 But the judicial rule here must give way 
after "Congress had determined to exercise its power to define the 
rules that should govern in this particular area in the trial of 
criminal cases instead of leaving the matter to the lawmaking of the 
courts."164 In view of the congressional power, exercised "from the 
earliest days," to prescribe rules of procedure in the federal courts, 
the Jencks statute, Palermo holds, "does not reach any constitu-
tional barrier."165 
The Palermo holding on the constitutional question appears 
sound. What is more debatable is the implication in the opinion 
of peremptory power in the Congress over the rule enunciated in 
Jencks. It is important to note that the Jencks statute enactment 
itself was by no means an assertion of such extreme legislative 
authority. On the contrary, as Justice Brennan (himself the author 
of the Jencks opinion) points out, "Congress had no thought to 
invade the traditional discretion of trial judges in evidentiary mat-
ters beyond checking extravagant interpretations of our decision in 
159 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 at 345-346 (1959). 
!160 Id. at 346. 
161 18 u.s.c. (1958) §3500. 
102 360 U.S. l!43 (1959). 
163 Id. at 345. 
164 Id. at 347-348. 
165Id. at 353, n. 11. 
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Jencks ., which were said to have been made by some· lower 
courts. Indeed Congress took particular pains to make it clear that 
the legislation 'reaffirms' that decision's holding."166 What the 
Jencks statute does is to specify what documents a defendant is 
entitled to, as well as the procedural mechanics involved in secur-
ing their production. It, in other words, preserves the underlying 
rights, if not the identical procedures, dictated by J encks.161 
If the Congress had sought to abrogate the ] enc ks rule, an en-
tirely different question would have been presented. In such a 
case, what Justice Brennan terms "an obvious constitutional prob-
lem"168 would exist. It should be emphasized that, in Jencks itself, 
the Court spoke in the broadest terms. The opinion there re-
dounds in the broad language of "justice." By its holding, the 
Court was articulating a fundamental requirement of fair pro-
cedure. While it is thus, to quote Justice Brennan again, "true that 
our holding in Jencks was not put on constitutional grounds, for it 
did not have to be; . . . it would be idle to say that the commands 
of the Constitution were not close to the surface of the decision."169 
The constitutional overtones in I enc ks indicate that there would be 
grave doubt about the power of Congress itself to do violence to 
what the Court held to be a fundamental principle of "justice." 
"Less substantial restrictions than this of the common-law rights 
of confrontation of one's accusers have been struck down by this 
Court under the Sixth Amendment."170 
During last term, the Court dealt with several questions not 
specifically answered by I encks and the I enc ks statute. In Pitts.: 
bur:gh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,171 the Court rejected a claim 
that ] enc ks required the government to permit defendants to in-
spect the grand jury minutes covering the testimony before that 
body of a key government witness at the trial. ] encks, said a bare 
majority of the Court, "is in nowise controlling here. It had 
nothing to do with grand jury proceedings and its language was 
not intended to encompass grand jury minutes."172 In the Court's 
view, the policy behind the historic secrecy of grand jury proceed-
ings outweighs the interest of defendant in disclosure. Hence, the 
lifting of secrecy here is not essential to the fair administration of 
criminal justice within the sense of the I encks holding. 
166 Concurring, id. at 361. 
167 See comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674 at 686 (1958). 
168 Concurring, in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 at 362 (1959). 
169 Id. at 362·363. 
110 Id. at 362. 
171360 U .s. 395 (1959). 
112 Id. at 398. 
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In the already-referred-to Palermo case,173 the Court dealt with 
the question of the types of document to which a defendant is 
entitled under the Jencks statute. According to Palermo, the 
statute now constitutes the exclusive vehicle whereby production 
of statements of government witnesses may be made to the defense 
in criminal cases. Consequently, only the documents included in 
its language need be produced. What are these documents? 
In Palermo itself, the document whose disclosure was sought 
was a particular memorandum summarizing what a witness had 
said during a conference with government agents, executed by one 
of th.e agents present. The Court, five-to-four, held that, under 
the statute, such document did not have to be produced. The 
] encks statute expressly includes written statements made by 
government witnesses. The document at issue was patently not 
such a statement. But the statute does not limit the right to produc-
tion to statements signed by witnesses themselves. Under it the 
statements to which a defendant is entitled include, in addition: 
"A stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a 
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of 
an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the Govern-
ment and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such 
oral statement."174 According to Palermo, by this language, "the 
statute was meant to encompass more than mere automatic repro-
ductions of oral statements."175 The difficult question, of course, 
is to determine how much more was meant to be included. 
In the Court's view, "the legislation was designed to eliminate 
the danger of distortion and misrepresentation inherent in a report 
which merely selects portions, albeit accurately, from a lengthy 
oral recital."176 Hence, it is not necessary to produce "summaries 
of an oral statement which evidence substantial selection of mate-
rial, or which were prepared after the interview without the aid 
of complete notes, and hence rest on the memory of the agent."177 
The memorandum of interview at issue in Palermo, according to 
the Court, was just such a skeleton version of what had actually 
transpired. 
It may well be that, on its facts, Palermo is correct in its holding 
on this point. At the same time, it would be most unfortunate if 
Palermo were to be used as the starting point for an unduly restric-
178 Note 162 supra. 
17418 U.S.C. (1958) §3500 (e)(2). 
171i 360 U.S. 343 at 352 (1959). 
176lbid. 
177 Id. at 352-353. 
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tive interpretation of the rights of defendants. In the eloquent 
words of Justice Brennan's opinion, "it would do violence to the 
understanding on which Congress, working at high speed under 
the pressures of the end of a session, passed the statute, if we were to 
sanction applications of it exalting and exaggerating its restrictions, 
in disregard of the congressional aim of reaffirming the basic 
Jencks principle of assuring the defendant a fair opportunity to 
make his defense."178 
If the future cases lose sight of this, they will open the door to 
constant efforts by law enforcement officers to defeat the spirit of 
Jencks. "There inheres in an overrigid interpretation and applica-
tion of the statute the hazard of encouraging a practice of govern-
ment agents' taking statements in a fashion calculated to insulate 
them from production."179 Under some of the language in 
Palermo, such insulation is all too easy from the government's point 
of view. 
An obvious question that arises to one familiar with the high 
Court's role in the criminal field is that of the effect of Jencks and 
the Jencks statute on state convictions. Jencks itself, we have seen, 
has clear constitutional implications. Violation of its rule, in 
Justice Brennan's phrase in Palermo, raises "a serious question of 
potential invasion of Sixth Amendment rights. "180 Yet, as empha-
sized in the prior section of this article, a state conviction will not 
be reversed only because such federal right would be violated, if 
the conviction were a federal one. The test, where the criminal 
case is a state one, is whether due process is violated and such viola-
tion occurs only if the right violated is so fundamental that it is 
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."181 Is the right of de-
fendant under Jencks such a right? The broad basis upon which 
the holding in Jencks was based would seem to point to an affirma-
tive answer. The Jencks opinion itself, ~fter enunciating its rule, 
asserts, "Justice requires no less."182 If that is true, Jencks is more 
than a rule governing only federal trials. By articulating Jencks in 
terms of a fundamental of justice,183 the Court foreshadowed its 
inclusion in the due process upon which its control of state criminal 
proceedings is based. · 
178 Id. at 365. 
179 Id. at 365-366. 
180 Id. at 363. 
181 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 325 (1937). 
1s2 353 U.S. 657 at 669 (1957). 
183 Compare comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1409 at 1415 (1959). 
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VII. FIRST AMENDMENT CASES 
In protesting against the decision of the Court in one case last 
term, Justice Black asserted, "the Court once again retreats from 
what I conceive to be its highest duty, that of maintaining unim-
paired the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Bill of Rights."184 To Justice Black, there is 
little doubt that the priniary function of the high bench is to vindi-
cate the personal rights of the individual as against the State. Such 
rights, in his view, were intended to have a preferred position in our 
constitutional scheme. 
The "preferred position" theory in this respect has been urged 
with especial force with regard to those rights guaranteed by the 
First Amendment. That amendment, declared Justice Black, dis-
senting in the already-discussed Barenblatt case,185 "says in no 
equivocal language that Congress shall pass no' law abridging 
freedom of speech, press, assembly or petition."186 Proceeding 
from this absolute language, Justice Black goes on to take an 
absolutist position with regard to First Amendment rights. He 
concedes that, in other cases, congressional action is to be upheld 
if it is based upon a reasonable balancing of the interests involved. 
But, he affirms in his Barenblatt dissent, "I do not agree that laws 
directly abridging First Amendment freedoms can be justified 
by a congressional or judicial balancing process."187 
In Barenblatt itself, as our previous discussion of it indicated, 
what was at issue was a congressional investigation into un-American 
activities. The particular hearing was one on Communist infiltra-
tion into the field of education. Petitioner, a college teacher, was 
asked about Communist activities and affiliations while he had 
been a graduate student. He urged that such inquiries transgressed· 
the First Amendment. The Court, in rejecting his contention, was 
clearly acting contrary to the preferred-position theory. In its view, 
"Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental 
interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by 
the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in 
the particular circumstances shown."188 In a case like this, "the 
close nexus between the Communist Party and violent overthrow 
184. Dissenting in Anonymous No. 6 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 at 299-300 (1959). 
185 Note 18 supra. 
186 360 U.S. 109 at 140 (1959). 
187 Id. at 141. 
188 Id. at 126. 
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of government"189 is found to justify this congressional inquiry 
into an area covered by the First Amendment. 
Nor is the legislative authority in such a case defeated because 
its investigation was one into the field of education. There was 
language in the Court's 1957 Sweezy opinion190 which appeared to 
immunize education from all legislative inquiry. In Barenblatt, 
the Court repudiates such broad implication: "We think that in-
vestigatory power in this domain is not to be denied Congress solely 
because the field of education is involved. Nothing in the pre-
vailing opinions in Sweezy . . . stands for a contrary view."191 
The Barenblatt clarification in this respect seems most salutary. 
The claims of academic freedom hardly justify the wholesale pro-
hibition of inquiries into Communist activity in the field of educa-
tion. Barenblatt holds specifically that the Constitution is no bar 
against action by the Congress "inquiring into the extent to which 
the Communist Party has succeeded in infiltrating into our uni-
versities, or elsewhere, persons and groups committed to furthering 
the objective of overthrow."192 
It has been asserted that the preferred-position theory is really 
an "old theory."193 At the same time, it is clear that its importance 
today dates from about two decades ago, starting with the famous 
footnote of Justice Stone in the Carolene Products case.194 From 
about 1943 to 19_48, the preferred-position philosophy was actually 
accepted by a majority of the Court.195 From 1949 on, however, 
the Court receded from that position. Under the Vinson Court, in 
fact, only Justices Black and Douglas remained to adhere to the 
doctrine of firstness of the First Amendment. 
Barenblatt is significant because it clearly demonstrates that, 
in the present Court also, a definite majority rejects the preferred-
position theory. It is true that the· Chief Justice joined Justice 
Douglas in the advocacy of that theory contained in Justice Black's 
dissent. Of even more significance, however, is the refusal of more 
than three members of the Court to adhere to the theory. Justice 
Brennan, often found with the Black-Douglas-Warren wing> was 
careful to dissent on separate grounds and thus to dissociate him-
self from concurrence in the Black advocacy of the preferred-posi-
tion approach. 
1so Id. at 128. 
100 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). See especially p. 251. 
191360 U.S. 109 ·at 129. (1959). . 
192Ibid. 
193 See Cahn, in 1958 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN I.Aw 699 (1959). · 
194 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152, n. 4 (-1938). 
195 See SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME CoURT 235 (1957). 
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An important question arising under the First Amendment is 
that of the types of speech safeguarded by the constitutional 
guaranty. In 1957 the Court expressly recognized that obscene 
speech stands outside the pale of First Amendment protection.196 
Is the same true of speech whose primary purpose is private profit? 
In a 1942 case,197 the Court held that the protection of the First 
Amendment did not extend to business advertisements. Accord-
ing to Justice Douglas last term, this ruling "has not survived re-
flection. "198 The First Amendment, he said, is not at all restricted 
to cultural ends. A protest against government action that affects 
business interests also comes within the amendment. In the 
Douglas view, "The profit motive should make no difference, for 
that is an element inherent in the very conception of a press under 
our system of free enterprise. Those who make their living through 
exercise of First Amendment rights are no less entitled to its protec-
tion than those whose advocacy or promotion is not hitched to a 
profit motive."199 And, if that is true, it is "difficult to draw a line 
between that group and those who in other lines of endeavor ad-
vertise their wares by different means."200 
Perhaps the best cases to illustrate the soundness of the view 
that the existence of a First Amendment right does not depend 
upon the absence of a profit motive are those involving censorship 
of motion pictures. In 1915, the Court refused to hold movies 
within the constitutional guaranty, on. the ground that they were 
"a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for 
profit."201 In the 1952 Burstyn case,202 on the other hand, the 
Court declared that this was irrelevant to the First Amendment 
issue, and held that motion pictures were within the ambit of pro-
tection accorded by the amendment. 
During the past term, the Court was once again required to con-
sider the impact of a motion picture censorship law upon First 
Amendment rights. In Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. 
Regents of the University of the State of New York,203 the statute 
at issue required a license for the distribution or exhibition of 
any motion picture. No license was to issue if a film was found by 
196 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Justices Douglas and Black, it should 
be noted, dissented even here, for their absolutist position does not permit such a holding. 
197Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
198 Concurring in Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 at 514 (1959). 
199 Ibid. 
200Ibid. 
201 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230 at 244 (1915). 
202 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
203 360 U.S. 684 (1959). See note, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 134 (1959). 
204 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
the licensing agency to be "immoral" or "of such a character that 
its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals." These terms were 
further defined as denoting a motion picture "the dominant pur-
pose or effect of which is erotic or pornographic; or which portrays 
acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or lewdness, or which ex-
pressly or impliedly presents such acts as desirable, acceptable or 
proper patterns of behavior." 
At issue in Kingsley was the denial of a license for the film 
"Lady Chatterley's Lover." Such denial was based on the broad 
ground that "the whole theme of this motion picture is immoral 
under said law, for that theme is the presentation of ad1.:1ltery as 
a desirable, acceptable and proper pattern of behavior."204 The 
question for the Court was whether the state could deny a license to 
a motion picture because, in the words of the New York court, 
"its subject matter is adultery presented as being right and desirable 
for certain people under certain circumstances."205 To put it in an-
other way, could New York deny a license to any film which approv-
ingly portrays an adulterous relationship, quite without reference 
to the manner of its portrayal? 
The opinion of the Court, by Justice Stewart, answered this 
question in the negative: "What New York has done ... is to 
prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture 
advocates an idea - that adultery under certain circumstances may 
be proper behavior. Yet the First Amendment's basic guarantee 
is of freedom to advocate ideas. The State, quite simply, has thus 
struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty."206 
In view of the interpretation of the New York statute by the 
highest court of that state, it is hard to see how the high tribunal 
could have decided otherwise.207 The New York court construed 
the law as giving to the term "sexual immorality" a concept entirely 
different from the concept embraced in words like "obscenity" or 
"pornography." The film at issue, in fact, was expressly found 
below not to be obscene or one whic;:h would operate itself as an 
incitement to illegal action. Yet that made no difference under the 
New York court's interpretation. The inflexible command which 
it attributed to the state legislature was to outlaw any approving 
204 360 U.S. 684 at 685 (1959). 
205 Id. at 687-688. 
206 Id. at 688. Four justices concurred in the opinion of the Court. 
201 But see the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan, id. at 702, joined by Justices 
Frankfurter and Whittaker, interpreting the statute as requiring obscene content or in-
citement to unlawful conduct. With this interpretation the statute was said to be consti-
tutional on its face, but unconstitutionally applied tp the film in question. The ramifica-
tions of this concurring opinion are discussed in note, 58 MICH. L. REv. 134 (1959). 
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portrayal of an adulterous relationship. This is, in effect, to bar 
mere advocacy of conduct contrary to most people's moral stand-
ards. But the Constitution clearly protects advocacy alone - i.e., 
where it falls short of incitement. "Its guarantee is not confined 
to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a 
majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may 
sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the 
single tax. "208 
The interpretation below enabled the Court to avoid the far 
more difficult question which has been inherent in all of the movie 
censorship cases presented to it - namely, that of whether any prior 
censorship of motion pictures is consistent with the Constitution. 
Justices Douglas and Black have adhered to the view that all such 
censorship is invalid. In their view, as again expressed in their 
concurring opinion in Kingsley, "censorship of movies is uncon-
stitutional, since it is a form of 'previous restraint' that is as much at 
war with the First Amendment, made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth, as the censorship struck down in Near v. 
State of Minnesota . ... I can find in the First Amendment no 
room for any censor whether he is scanning an editorial, reading a 
news broadcast, editing a novel or a play, or previewing a 
movie."209 
Although there is much to be said for this point of view in a 
system which has, since Blackstone, abhorred any prior restraint of 
organs of public opinion, it is probable that the majority of the 
Court would not go so far. To most of the justices, motion pictures 
would appear to be comparable to speech in a street or public 
place which is subject to regulation under properly drawn statutes. 
A Court which held only three years ago that "obscenity is not with-
in the area of constitutionally protected speech or press"210 would 
hardly be likely to prohibit to the states all authority to deal with 
obscenity in films. 
VIII. THE COURT AS AN INSTITUTION 
Analysis of the highest tribunal's decisions during a given term 
may enable one to acquire a picture of the different aspects of our 
public law as they are unfolded. Even more important, however, 
is the fact that such analysis permits a broader view of the working 
208 360 U.S. 684 at 689 (1959). 
209 Id. at 697. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), is the leading case on censorship 
of newspapers. , 
210 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 485 (1957). 
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of the Supreme Court as a governmental institution. From an in-
stitutional point of view, what do last term's decisions tell us about 
the functioning of the high bench? 
Perhaps the most significant thing to note about the Supreme 
Court during the past year is an accentuation in the polarization 
that has become its most striking characteristic. In the present 
writer's article on the decisions of the 1957 term, the sharp 
division in the Court as between the rival judicial philosophies of 
Justices Frankfurter and Black was noted.211 During the 1958 
term, the same split continued to dominate the work of the justices. 
In all of the cases of note where there was a sharp split in the 
Court,212 the exponents of the Frankfurter approach were to be 
found on the one side, th,ose of the Black view on the other. Even 
where the two schools were able to agree on the result in particular 
cases, they all too frequently articulated their differences in 
approach in separate concurrences.213 
To be sure, internal fragmentation is nothing new ~n the 
history of our highest tribunal. A splintered Supreme Court is, 
indeed, but the juristic reflection of a pluralistic society, which has 
as its basis acceptance of the fact that there is no single, simple 
answer to the multifold problems which call for resolution by 
governmental action. If the Court is sharply divided, it is because 
the questi_ons presented to it call for anything but clear, ineluct-
able responses. 
From the point of view of its over-all functioning, the signifi-
cant thing to note about our high tribunal is the fact that, even 
when it has presented a far from edifying spectacle of internal 
atomization, it has continued to function as an institutional entity. 
Even at such a time, the Court has continued to weave the basic 
pattern of its jurisprudence. This has be.en true because, at any 
given time, a particular approach to the judicial function receives 
the adherence of five or more of the justices. · 
211 See Schwartz, "The Supreme Court-October 1957 Term," 57 MICH. L. REv. 315 
at 347 (1959). 
212 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 
(1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); 
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959). Compare Northwestern States Portland 
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), and Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. 
Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959), where the split was not as clearly on the same doctrinal 
grounds. 
213 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 
(19,59); Kingsley J;ntemational Pictures v. Regents of the University of New York, 360 U.S. 
684 (1959). It is not surprising, in view of this, that the number of dissents and concur-
rences during the term remained as high as ever. 
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During the past term, a clear majority of the Court214 has in-
dicated its acceptance of the Frankfurter, as opposed to the Black, 
approach to the resolution of constitutional issues. In all of the key 
decisions already discussed, a majority of the justices adhered to 
the more restrained view of the judicial function which Justice 
Frankfurter has advocated in his two decades on the bench. On 
the other hand, the other four members of the Court215 do gen-
erally follow more or less what has come to be termed the "activist" 
position. Yet, even here, the past term has seen what may fore-
shadow a weakening in that position. Thus, only Justices Black, 
Douglas, and the Chief Justice adhered rigidly to the extreme 
activist approach. In two significant cases, Barenblatt216 and 
Bartkus,211 Justice Brennan was careful not to join the Black-Doug-
las position. On the key questions of whether First Amendment 
rights are to be treated as having a preferred position and whether 
the Bill of Rights guarantees are automatically included in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Brennan thus indicated a tend-
ency to swing over to the Frankfurter position. 
Aside from the school segregation issue (where the Court was 
bound to provoke the bitter reaction of an area whose very way of 
life was uprooted by application of the relevant constitutional pro-
vision), the current controversy over the high tribunal stems largely 
from its decisions rendered at the end of the 1956 term. Watkins,218 
Sweezy,219 Covert,220 ]encks,221 Mallory,222 - these 1957 decisions 
were seen by many to mark the end of a juristic era, comparable to 
the change inaugurated twenty years earlier with the landmark 
Jones and Laughlin decision.223 Between 1937 and 1957, the dom-
inant theme in the Supreme Court had been its deference toward 
the political branches. The 1957 decisions were taken by some 
commentators to signal the end of the subdued role that had come 
to characterize the Court in the post-1937 period. 
Last term's decisions indicate that such an interpretation may 
have been over-hasty. The principal decisions rendered during 
1959 have the Frankfurter self-restraint approach as their dominant 
214 Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart. 
215 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan. 
216 Note 18 supra. 
217 Note llO supra. 
218 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
219 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
220 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
221 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
222 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). 
223 NLRB v. Jones 8: Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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theme. More than that, they go far to correct some of the excesses 
in several of the 1957 opinions which had disturbed many observ-
ers. Thus, Barenblatt,224 as already discussed, supplies a needed 
corrective to the wholesale implications of Watkins;225 Uphaus226 
does the same for Sweezy,227 as well as for the 1956 Nelson deci-
sion;228 and Palermo229 approves a legislative rectification of the 
excesses implicit in J encks.230 All in all, the 1958 term must appear 
most satisfactory for those who have felt that the extreme activist 
position does violence to the demands which society imposes upon 
the judicial process. 
There are, to be sure, those who deplore any decline in the 
activist approach. To them, a judicial attitude of deference toward 
the legislator leaves us unprotected against violations of constitu-
tional right. This is, however, to ignore the basic limitations which 
must obtain upon judicial power in a system such as ours. Judicial 
review, no matter how we may gloss over it, is basically an un• 
democratic institution. If the democratic bases of our system are to 
be respected, the review power of the one non-democratic organ 
of our government must be exercised with rigorous self-restraint. 
Laws duly enacted by the people's representatives should not be 
aborted by judicial fiat unless the judges are presented with no 
other choice in the matter. The decisions of the 1958 term show 
clearly that a majority of the justices today agree that proper defer-
ence toward the representatives of the people still remains the 
judicial handmaiden of democracy. 
224 360 U .s. 109 {1959). 
226 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
226 360 U.S. 72 (1959). 
227 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
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